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Abstract
In 1986, during a second decade of severe droughts and famine, an
Intergovernmental Authority was established by Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia,
Somalia and Sudan to focus on the problems of drought and desertification.
At the same time, however, this Authority inevitably took upon it the related
tasks of conflict resolution and development. Later on Uganda and Eritrea
joined the renamed Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). An
overview is given of conflicts in the region, and in Sudan. What the paper
concentrates on, however, is IGAD’s patient and apparently quite effective
role in managing and resolving conflict, especially within Sudan itself.
Appropriate details are given, stubborn and shifting positions of governments
and rebel movements in Sudan are summarised, and concluding recommen-
dations, warnings and encouragements are provided. 
39
41
Conflict resolution in a turbulent region
been the principle supplier of arms to Sudan, with Sudan offering China oil
concessions. China is reported to have sold Sudan SCUD missiles in 1996 at
the cost of a $200m loan from Malaysia, another country prospecting oil in
Sudan. The conservative Islamic Gulf states, for example, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, support the SPLA because of their fear
of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan. Sudan was the only Sub-
Saharan African country that supported Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War (Adar
1998a:46). Apart from these linkages, there are other pertinent concerns for
IGAD in the region and beyond, which deserve some observation. Sudan
supports other militias operating in the continent, for example, Islamic Group
(Egypt), Islamic Salvation Front (ISF, Algeria), Islamic Oromo Front (IOF,
Ethiopia), Somali National Alliance (SNA, Somalia), Ethiopian Islamic
Opposition (EIO, Ethiopia), Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (Islamic Union, Somalia),
Tunisian Islamic Front (TIF, Tunisia), and other Islamic groups in Kenya,
Niger, Gambia and Senegal. These groups are trained in areas such as
Damazin, Equatoria, and Hamesh Koreb near Eritrea. These are some of the
wider problems which face IGAD in its conflict resolution initiatives in
Sudan.
Egypt is faced with a dilemma. First, it is concerned with the growing
Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan which spills over into its territory. Indeed,
it is because of Sudan’s unhappiness with the Egyptian pro-Western stance
that Khartoum was alleged to have planned the assassination of Hosni
Mubarak during the 1995 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) meeting in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Adar 1998a:47 and Africa Confidential July
7,1995:1). Second, the Egyptian dependence on the Nile River water makes
the regime in Cairo wary of the implications of secession and independence of
the South and they therefore support a unified Sudan. Third, the long
standing Sudo-Egyptian dispute over the Halaib territory near the Red Sea
adds to the complexity of the situation between the two countries. Egypt is not
the only country that is fearful of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The
other countries which are targeted by the Sudanese National Islamic Front
(NIF) include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (at least before its
civil war broke-out), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Eritrea, with the latter
fighting against the Eritrean Islamic jihad (Africa Confidential June
9,1995:2-3). The visit by Laurent Kabila of the DRC to Ethiopia in April
1998 is an indication of this wider “conflict triangulation” in the region
(Ethiopia Herald 1998 and Horn of Africa: The Monthly Review 1998).
Conflict in the area has, at one time or another, experienced inter-regional
40
Korwa G. Adar
1. Inside a turbulent region: IGAD’s commitment to 
conflict resolution
Ever since its foundation in 1986 the Intergovernmental Authority on
Drought and Desertification (IGADD), later renamed Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), has faced the enormous task of resolving
conflicts in the Horn Of Africa. The Horn of Africa remains one of the most
volatile regions on the continent, where internal civil wars have led to the
total collapse of Somalia, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, the ongoing
border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as the polarisation of
Northern and Southern (and the Nuba Mountains people) Sudanese advo-
cating for Islamic and secular state conceptions respectively. Conflict in the
region, as in other parts of Africa, is not only “internationalised” (Adar
1998a), but it leads to what has been called “conflict triangulation” (Lyons
1996:88; Midlarsky 1992).
Uganda served as a base and arms conduit for the Southern Sudanese
Anya Nya rebels in the 1960s and continues to play the same role for the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)/Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA). The SPLA also receives military support from Zimbabwe,
Namibia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Israel and the United States. However, the SPLA’s
main source of arms is the international market, with some of its arms coming
from those captured by its forces from the Sudanese army. Sudan, on the other
hand, supports William Kony’s (formerly with Alice Lakwena who now lives
in a refugee camp in Kenya) Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile
Bank Front (WNBF) which are fighting Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s National
Resistance Army (NRA), renamed Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF).
The LRA is trained by Sudan at Jebelin, Kit II, and Musito and by 1997
numbered about 6,000 strong. Sudan also provided a base as well as material
and logistical support to the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) during
their struggle against Ethiopian regimes. The EPRDF was largely composed
of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF). While Sudan harboured the EPLF and EPRDF, Ethiopia gave
the SPLA safe havens for its military operations against Khartoum (Simons
1995; Lyons 1995 and Anyang’ Nyong’o 1991).
Whereas the US gave Sudan massive military support, particularly during
the reign of President Numeiri (1969-1985), Sudan now receives military aid
from China, Russia, Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq and Libya. China has since 1994
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within the context of “African Renaissance”. These regional International
Governmental Organisations (IGOs) are increasingly performing tasks which
go beyond socio-economic functional arrangements to those that fall within
the general purview of realpolitik security perspectives. We are witnessing a
shift away from the concept of “African solutions to African problems” to
“African ‘sub-regional’ solutions to African ‘sub-regional’ problems”. This is
a new phenomenon in the New World Order, at least with respect to Africa,
and is an important one given the tendency of the Western countries’ move-
ment towards isolationism in the post-Cold War era. The cases in point are the
military involvement of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Lesotho and Liberia respectively (Shaw &
Okolo 1994; Magyar & Conteh-Morgan 1998). This is not to argue that the
role of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in conflict resolution in the
continent has become irrelevant. What is emerging, is that African interna-
tional relations are increasingly characterised by increased involvement of
non-state actors in conflict resolution missions (Cleary 1997).
It is in this same vein that IGADD was transformed, that is, from an IGO
responsible for ecological (drought and desertification) and humanitarian
problems to one committed to conflict resolution, prevention and manage-
ment. IGAD’s role can be seen in this larger context. It was the catastrophic
droughts of the 1970s and the 1980s in the Horn of Africa which led to the
establishment of IGADD, with the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) initiating the process. The founders of IGADD charged the organisa-
tion with the responsibilities of: alerting the international community and
humanitarian agencies about emergencies in the region, bringing resources
needed to cope with the situations, co-ordinating emergency situations and
serving as an early warning system for the region. With financial support from
Italy, IGAD established at the regional and the national levels an Early
Warning and Food Information System (EWFIS) with remote sensing compo-
nents (UNEP 1996:4). In conjunction with the “Friends of IGAD” (Canada,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Britain and the US) and other groups such as the
Coalition for Peace in the Horn (US), European Working Group on the Horn
(Canada) as well as other NGOs, IGAD continues to meet some of its obliga-
tions. However, some of the present stumbling blocks to IGAD’s peace
process include lack of resources, capacity to implement programmes, trans-
parency and co-ordination, grass-roots level participation and democratisation
in general; and instability in the region.
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dimensions, with the 1977-78 Ethio-Somali and the on-going 1998-2000
Ethio-Eritrean wars being good examples. The Ethio-Eritrean war has also
weakened the Ugandan-Ethiopian-Eritrean coalition against Sudan. The
irony of the scenario is that it is likely to help the IGAD peace process
because Sudan may soften its stance in the Sudo-SPLM negotiations. The fact
that Uganda is locked in the DRC civil war is an added advantage to the
Sudanese. The civil war in the DRC occupies the Rwandan, Ugandan and the
SPLA’s human and material resources because of their support for the rebels
fighting the Kabila regime (Horn of Africa Bulletin Nov-Dec 1998). The arms
deliveries to the DRC are mainly carried out by the three East African based
air carriers such as Air Alexander International, Busy Bee, Sky Air,
Planetair, United Airlines as well as Sudanese and Ugandan military aircraft.
The on-going 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war, which erupted because of
the disputed Badme area, has added a new dimension to the realpolitik in the
region, with over 50,000 Eritreans expelled from Ethiopia and more than
10,000 Ethiopians losing their jobs in Eritrea. It is because of the Ethio-
Eritrean war that a rapprochement has been re-established between Ethiopia
and Sudan, severed previously as a result of the assassination attempt on
Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ethiopia has not only closed the SPLA’s
base in Gambela in western Ethiopia but has also agreed with Hussein
Mohamed Aideed of Somalia to prevent the OLF operations against Ethiopia
from their bases in Somalia. These are some of the immediate and long term
challenges that face IGAD, particularly with respect to conflict resolution in
Sudan. Conflicts in the Horn of Africa not only create operational and func-
tional difficulties for IGAD but the multiplicity of the non-state actors, with
national, regional, continental and global interests, provide additional multi-
farious impact on IGAD. The paper addresses this complex scenario in
relation to IGAD. Specifically, it examines the role of IGAD in conflict reso-
lution in Sudan.
2. IGAD’s regional dynamics and its linkage to Sudan
The development of more specific responsibilities in the region
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the emergence of the “second wave” of
regional functional organisations in Africa (Shaw 1995; Nyangoro & Shaw
1998). These second-generation functional organisations perform tasks which
conform to the idea of “African solutions to African problems” conceptualised
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because of famine which affected most of Sub-Saharan Africa and led to the
formation of the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
(ICARA) (Kibreab 1994).
The original founders of IGADD, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and
Sudan (later joined by Eritrea and Uganda), concerned with the perpetual
conflict and humanitarian situations in the region, with its 133 million
people, recognised that sustainable economic development of the Horn of
Africa was contingent upon peace and security. Regional co-operation there-
fore becomes a necessity, particularly in areas where the “security of the state
and its rulers are threatened” (Clapham 1996:120; Buzan 1983). It was the
1973-74 famine which led to the collapse of Emperor Haile Sellasie and
instigated unrest in Sudan. Similarly, the 1984-85 famine contributed to the
downfall of Numeiri and weakened Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime paving
the way for its collapse.
The problems in the IGAD region are also compounded by refugees and
the internally displaced people. The civil war in Sudan has killed more
people than any other war since World War II. It has killed more people than
the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Chechnya
combined. For the past fifteen years it has claimed the lives of more than 
60,000, 5,000, 1,200, and 180 people per year, per month, per week and per
day, respectively. Over 80% of Southern Sudanese are internally displaced.
More than 100,000 died of famine in 1998 alone (Fisher-Thompson 1999;
Winter 1999). In 1990, for example, there were over 2 million refugees in the
area (Bakwesegha 1994:5). Together with internally displaced people the
total number of refugees in the IGAD region reached 5 million in 1994
(USAID 1994). By 1991 there were nearly 1 million Ethiopians who had fled
their country due to the civil war and famine. The UNHCR repatriated 31,617
(1995), 62,000 (between 1993 and 1996) and 4,400 (1997) Ethiopian
refugees from Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya respectively (UNHCR 1997). On
the other hand Ethiopia received more than 338,000 refugees early in 1997,
of whom 285,000, 35,500, 8,000 and 8,600 were Somalis, Sudanese,
Djiboutians and Kenyans, respectively. The 1991 overthrow of Siad Barre and
the continued intra-clan and sub-clan “battle of territorial control” have
forced more than 900,000 Somalis to flee their country, mainly to the neigh-
bouring countries of IGAD member states. By the time Eritrea seceded from
Ethiopia in 1993, over 900,000 Eritreans had fled their country (Adam
1995). The UNHCR spent over $260 million between 1994 to 1995 to repa-
triate the Eritreans, mainly from Sudan (UNHCR 1998). The refugee problem
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In 1996 EWFIS estimated that its members required more than 21 million
metric tons of cereals annually to meet the needs of those affected in the
region. The 1996 IGAD total food aid imports reached 805,000 metric tons,
with Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Kenya accounting for over
231,000, 186,000, 167,000, 117,000 and 74,000 metric tons respectively.
The other two IGAD members, Uganda and Djibouti, received food aid
totalling 15,000 metric tons each in the same period (IGAD 1996; IGAD
1999). IGAD encourages intra-regional trade to promote self-sufficiency 
and sustainable development as well as co-operation among its members.
However, food deficits still account for some of the problems facing IGAD,
with Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea being the largest recipients in the
1990s.
Some of the immediate challenges facing the countries in the Horn of
Africa and IGAD as well as national and international non-state actors oper-
ating in the region have been drought, famine, refugees as well as victims of
landmines and war. Conflict remains the major contributing factor with far
reaching ramifications to the disasters because of instability in the region. As
Table One demonstrates, the emergency food aid which the IGAD members
(including Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania) received between 1985 to 1994
was more than double the regular food aid. For example, the emergency food
aid which they received as a percentage of the total food aid in 1985, 1992
and 1994 accounted for more than 67%, 85% and 105% respectively. As
Table One shows the Emergency Food Aid for 1985, a year before IGADD
was founded, accounted for over $378 million compared to nearly $140
million Regular Food Aid. Between 1989 and 1994 the Emergency Food Aid
increased steadily in comparison to the Regular Food Aid. Thousands of
people died of famine in Ethiopia and Sudan between 1984 and 1985 mainly
Key: EFA: Emergency Food Aid;  RFA: Regular Food Aid
Source: USAID 1995
Table 1. Food aid trends in the greater Horn of Africa,
1985-1994 ($millions)
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historic agreement which led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations
between Ethiopia and Somalia (Simons 1995:69, Lyons 1995:245). The
rapprochement between the two countries was historic because they had
fought the 1977-78 bitter war which involved the United States, the Soviet
Union and Cuba.
With reference to the 1997 Cairo Accord involving the leading Somalia
factions and endorsed by the League of Arab States, IGAD stated in its
Declaration adopted by the 17th Session of the Council of Ministers in
Djibouti 15th March, 1998 and reaffirmed by the IGAD Heads of State and
Government, that it is prepared to engage in “consultation with all those who
are prepared to contribute to the peace process in Somalia on the basis of the
IGAD initiative and on condition that they refrain from engaging in parallel
initiatives and limit themselves to supporting IGAD’s efforts” (IGAD 1998).
The issue of the centralisation of the Sudanese peace process within the
IGAD framework is an important one for the organisation, particularly with
respect to the co-ordination of the peace process.
The membership of Eritrea and the new leadership in Ethiopia gave
IGAD a new regional dynamism and stimulus in the peace process, initially
at least, particularly because Sudan had provided sanctuary for the former
allies, EPLF and EPRDF, who are now engaged in a devastating war. IGAD’s
original hope was that Eritrea and Ethiopia would provide a moderating influ-
ence on Sudan. However, this optimism never materialised following the
Eritrean severance of diplomatic relations with Sudan in December 1994
accusing Khartoum of supporting the Eritrean Islamic jihad (Deng 1995). As
a quid pro quo, Eritrea has been giving military, political, moral and logistical
support to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) fighting the Bashir
regime. In a show of displeasure with the Sudan Government, Eritrea handed
over the Sudan embassy in Asmara to the NDA. The differences between the
two countries entered a new phase in 1997 when Sudan, with Libyan disap-
proval, opposed the Eritrean application for membership to join the League of
Arab States. The planned investments in airports and hotels in Eritrea by a
multimillionaire Saudi Arabian businessman, Hani Yamani, Chairman of Air
Harbour Technologies Group, is likely to tip the balance in favour of Eritrean
admission into the League. The amalgamation of ten Eritrean opposition
movements in 1999 with the Sudo-Ethiopian mediatory efforts into the
Eritrean National Forces Alliance (ENFA) and the on-going Ethio-Eritrean
war, which began on May 6, 1998, continue to undermine IGAD’s peace
process in the region. The denial of entry both into Djibouti (IGAD’s
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in the IGAD region is not only a function of the perpetual civil wars, but also
a product of the environmental and economic factors which contribute to the
complexity of the situation. 
IGAD’s growing involvement in the Sudan peace process
IGAD became more involved in conflict resolution in Sudan from 1990, when
Sudan requested the organisation to assist in the peace process with the
Southern rebels. This was the second time in the history of the civil war in
Sudan that Khartoum decided to make its internal affairs a subject for discus-
sion by other interested parties to the conflict, like IGAD. The first time was
in 1972 when Numeiri entered into negotiations with the Southern Sudanese
rebels. The leadership in Sudan viewed IGAD as the only vehicle that could
prevent external actors from infringing on its internal affairs. In other words,
IGAD was seen “as a means to forestall the intervention of other powers with
greater leverage” (Deng et al 1996:161-162) and also as a regionally and
indigenously generated IGO which cuts across ethnopraxis (Avruch & Black
1991). Yet, when other members of IGAD – Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda –
pressured Sudan through IGAD to resolve the problem in the South, Sudan
quickly invoked its sovereignty (Deng et al 1996). This rigidity on the part of
Sudan notwithstanding, the leadership in Sudan accepted that the involve-
ment of IGAD in its internal affairs is legitimate. IGAD therefore responded
by gradually transforming itself into an organisation responsible for conflict
resolution in the region. It has established four hierarchical and complemen-
tary structures designed to deal with problems facing the region. They
include the Authority of Heads of State and Government which meets once a
year; the Council of Ministers, mainly Foreign Ministers, that meets twice a
year; the Committee of Ambassadors/Plenipotentiaries attached to the
Headquarters whose responsibilities are to advise and guide the Executive
Secretary; and a Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary, appointed by
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a term of four years,
renewable once. These administrative structures have expanded the objec-
tives and scope of IGAD in the region. The establishment of the 1993
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution by the OAU
is seen by IGAD as a complementary mechanism for regional co-operation
(Zartman 1995a; Zartman 1995b). IGAD was conceived within this broad
context, with a view to promote regional dynamism conducive to peace in the
Horn of Africa even if the end results were minimal. It was through IGADD’s
diplomatic initiative that Mengistu and Siad Barre agreed to sign the 1988
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gave $500,000 to the fund, of which $300,000 was donated by the US (Horn
of Africa: The Monthly Review 1998:2). The US has also earmarked over $7.4
million for IGAD over the next five years beginning from 1998. The revitali-
sation of IGAD, particularly in 1996, to an IGO responsible for economic
co-operation, conflict prevention, management and resolution, and humani-
tarian affairs has enhanced its mandate and expanded its objectives. With
“positive sovereignty” derived from effective state control eroding/having
eroded in the region, IGAD will continue to experience functional and opera-
tional difficulties. On the other hand turbulence in the region has enhanced
IGAD’s role to deal with internal conflict situations, traditionally regarded as
the sole preserve of sovereign states. Apart from these recurring problems,
the IGAD region, as other parts of Africa do, houses authoritarian and repres-
sive regimes, with some leaders like Moi of Kenya (one of the longest serving
presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa) presiding over a kleptocratic state. The
civil war in Sudan, fought on secular and Islamic ideological perspectives,
has forced the successive regimes in Khartoum to centralise power within the
ambit of the Presidency, using the state as an instrument for security, war and
oppression.
3. Inside a turbulent state: IGAD’s peace process in Sudan
Islamisation and minority religions
The civil war which broke out in 1955 between the Anya Nya of the South and
the Northern Sudanese regimes ended in 1972 and led to the reduction of
military and logistical support which the rebels received from the Central
Africa Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zaire as well as military training by the
Israelis. The Addis Ababa Accord was a landmark peace process brokered 
by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia. Sudan, under the leadership of Numeiri, accepted the terms of the
Accord which included, among other things, religious rights and autonomy
for the Southern Sudanese and other marginalised peoples. The Accord
established some form of regionalism in the area, with the formation of
Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG), the Nile Provisional
Government (NPG), the Anyidi Revolutionary Government (ARG), the Sue
River Revolutionary Government (SRRG), and the Sudan-Azania Government
(SAG), all of which incorporated specific ethnic groups. However, a rift which
occurred between the so-called “outsiders” (comprising those who went into
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Headquarters) and Ethiopia by IGAD’s Executive Secretary, Dr. Tekeste
Ghebray, an Eritrean, after attending IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF) meeting on
Somalia in Rome, November 1998, is a clear testimony to the difficulties that
face the organisation.
One of the central concerns of the US is the Libyan-Sudanese support 
for Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic organisations such as Hamas,
Hezbollah, Gamaat Islamiya, and Abu Nidal, which Washington considers to
be terrorists. The support by the Bush Administration for the partition of
Sudan based on the Ethiopian model of regionalism (ethno-regional federalist
arrangements) was not radically different from what the SPLM and the other
rebels have advocated since the 1950s, and which has been inscribed in the
IGAD Declaration of Principles (DOP). It is based on the idea of equality in
diversity, where the rights of individuals are clearly provided for in the
Constitution. The Clinton Administration, through the Greater Horn of Africa
Initiative (GHAI), launched in 1994 by the USAID Administrator, J Brian
Atwood, works in partnership with IGAD and has endorsed its DOP as the
framework for resolving the impasse in Sudan. The GHAI works in conjunc-
tion with other US Government Departments and agencies with interests in
the region, for example, USAID Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP),
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (FDA), Sudan Transition Assistance
for Rehabilitation (STAR), and Office of Food for Peace (FFP); and the State
Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), among
others, all of which support the IGAD peace process.
The Clinton Administration’s policy in Sudan is based on the long
standing policy of combating terrorism and regional extremism, supporting an
end to civil war, calling for respect for human rights, and promoting the
humanitarian situation (US Department of State, Testimony: E. Brynn on US
Policy Toward Sudan 1995:6). The August 1998 US bombing of a pharmaceu-
tical factory in Khartoum suspected of producing chemical weapons was
carried out within this larger context. The US bombing of the factory was in
response to the simultaneous bombings of American embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed nearly 500 people and
injured over 5,000 in Kenya alone. The accusations by the international relief
workers against the Sudanese Government for using chemical weapons
against the rebel strongholds in the South is likely to confirm the US claims
(Lynch 1999; Denyer 1999).
To help it cope with wars and disasters in the region IGAD established an
Emergency Fund and pledged to raise over $1 million. The Friends of IGAD
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thousands were killed and over 300,000 were displaced between 1991 and
1993. The rift between the two leaders was largely due to personal grounds
and a contest for the control of the movement.
With the help of IGAD, the SPLA-Mainstream and the SPLA-United
reached a consensus on two basic points as their negotiating positions with
the Sudanese Government, namely self-determination for the Southern
Sudanese and the Nuba Mountains, and a transitional period (Prendergast &
Bickel 1994). Riek Machar and his group renamed the SPLA-United to the
Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), which in 1997 amalga-
mated six factions into the United Salvation Democratic Front (USDF),
established a military wing named South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) and
allied to Khartoum. The al-Bashir National Islamic Front Government also
established a Coordinating Council for the Southern States (CCSS) and
rewarded Machar by appointing him to head the body which has not thus far
made any meaningful impact in the region.
IGAD’s role as the main peace broker has received continental and inter-
national recognition with the OAU, the United Nations and Friends of IGAD
(who later re-conceptualised their role as IGAD Partners’ Forum, IPF) giving
it more financial and political support. Apart from their support for IGAD’s
peace process, Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and
the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR) have
also proposed that international civilian human rights monitoring groups
should be stationed in the affected areas to monitor the human rights viola-
tions by the Sudanese government and the liberation movements (Prendergast
1997:21). IGAD’s role has, therefore, been legitimised and internationalised
with the support it receives from regional, continental and global state and
non-state actors. The factional differences notwithstanding, the Southern and
Nuba Mountains liberation movements generally agree on the objective of the
separation of Religion and State and self-determination.
The issue of the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile (SBN), given
their geographic location in the North, are tricky issues for the SPLA/SPLM
and other Southern liberation movements. The SPLA, with a quarter of its
60,000 army drawn from the Nuba, has insisted since 1985 that the area
constitutes part of Southern Sudan because of its marginalisation by the
regimes in Khartoum. A regional assembly was established in 1992 by the
SPLM/SPLA to legislate on matters pertaining to the area under its control
and to work closely with the SPLM’s Sudan Relief Rehabilitation Association
(SRRA) in the delivery of humanitarian needs (De Waal 1999:1; Prendergast
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exile and those who remained in the bush fighting the Sudan Government)
and “insiders” (those who remained in the country and formed political
parties and were also accused of collaborating with the regimes – a mistrust
which still prevails in the South) undermined tangible progress in consoli-
dating unity and autonomy. Faced with the threat of growing radical Islamic
fundamentalism and deteriorating economy at home, Numeiri abrogated the
terms of the Accord and reintroduced Islamisation. The decision led to the re-
emergence of the Southern Sudanese liberation movements in 1983. The
SPLM/SPLA and other liberation movements have been fighting for self-
determination, democracy and religious rights (Deng & Gifford 1987).
The incorporation of the Islamic sharia laws into the Constitution has led
to the centralisation of power and the adoption of a theocratic state in Sudan,
some of the consequences of which have been the marginalisation and repres-
sion of the non-Muslims (Adar forthcoming). The state is therefore used as an
instrument of oppression and by extension constitutes the centre of the
contestation between the North and the South. In this regard, it is fair to argue
that ever since the civil war broke out in 1983 the Sudanese state has gradu-
ally been “criminalised” through intra-state conflicts. Who are the major
contenders in the protracted Sudanese war against the regimes in Khartoum?
What are the main contentious issues at stake? What are the policy positions
of the centripetal and centrifugal forces? What role has IGAD played in its
attempt to broker peace in Sudan? Who are the other state and non-state
actors concerned with the situation in Sudan and what are their roles and
relationships with IGAD?
The issue of self-determination
As in other parts of Africa where civil wars are commonplace, intra-factional
conflicts have at one time or other undermined the unity and strength of the
liberation movements in Sudan. The major contenders in the liberation
struggle in Sudan have included among others, the SPLM/SPLA, the
Southern Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A), the Patriotic
Resistance Movement of Southern Sudan (PRMSS), the Southern Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SSPLM)/Anya Nya Two, and the Nuba
Mountains Solidarity (NMS). The 1991 split which occurred between John
Garang (Dinka) and Riek Machar (Nuer), the dominant personalities within
the SPLA/SPLM, led to factional fighting and the formation of the SPLA-
Mainstream (Torit Group, led by Garang) and the SPLA-United (Nasir Group,
led by Machar). This split caused a major rift within the movement and 
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The right of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine
their future status through a referendum must be affirmed … Maintaining
of unity of Sudan must be given priority by all the parties provided that
the following principles are established in the political, legal, economic
and social framework of the country: Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic,
multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommo-
dation of these diversities must be affirmed … Extensive rights of
self-determination on the basis of federation, autonomy ... to the various
peoples of Sudan must be affirmed. A secular and democratic state must
be established in Sudan.
(Horn of Africa Bulletin Sep-Oct 1994:27)
The DOP incorporated most of the negotiating positions of the Southern
movements and in that light can be considered a triumph for the liberation
movements, particularly for the SPLM/SPLA. The DOP also provided that the
people of Sudan (North and South) had the right to determine their future
through a referendum if the two parties fail to agree on the major principles
contained in the Declaration.
Responses to the Declaration of Principles
The IGAD Declaration of Principles received a boost following its endorse-
ment by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which is comprised of,
among others, the SPLA/SPLM, the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP), the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), and the Legitimate
Command led by Gen. Faithi Ahmed Ali, who are fighting against the NIF
government of Bashir. Since then, the Government of Sudan has been under
pressure from the northern and southern opposition movements to accept
IGAD’s Declaration of Principles. The NDA endorsement of IGAD’s
Declaration of Principles came as a result of the consensus which emerged at
the end of the December 1994 Chukudum Accord between the Umma Party,
led by former President Sadiq al-Mahdi (1985-1989), and the SPLA/SPLM,
and was later reinforced by the 1995 Asmara Declaration of the NDA.
Most of the IGOs and NGOs operating in the Horn of Africa and Sudan in
particular have endorsed the 1994 DOP promulgated by IGAD, thereby inter-
nationalising and legitimising its role. During their meeting with the UN
Security Council members at their mission in Sweden, in November 1998,
CARE International, Oxfam, Doctors without Borders, and Save the Children
called on the UN to “generate a forceful and positive lobby for peace” and 
to “reinforce and complement the IGAD process” (Horn of Africa Bulletin
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1997:58). The Sudanese Government, however, maintains that the Nuba
Mountains is part of the North and as such is not subject to any negotiations
based on self-determination perspectives. On this issue, Sudan has received
sympathetic support among the IGAD members, Egypt and the OAU in
general. The OAU has remained conservative on the question of self-determi-
nation conceptualised within the context of re-drawing of the African states’
boundaries. The principle of uti possidetis institutionalised within the Charter
of the OAU, in most cases, still carries the day.
Issues with regard to secular democracy
It needs to be emphasised that the issue of self-determination has not been
the only negotiating position of the SPLM/SPLA and other liberation move-
ments. The liberation movements’ original negotiating positions in the 1980s
and early 1990s were based on the following perspectives: non-sectarian and
non-theocratic states; united confederal states based on democracy, human
rights and equality; and self-determination. These were the SPLM’s negoti-
ating positions in the 1992 and 1993 Abuja (Nigeria) mediation. It is
important to note that the inclusion of self-determination as a condition for
the South and the Nuba liberation came as a result of the National Islamic
Front (NIF) Government’s insistence on the adoption of sharia law, with the
SPLM/SPLA stressing that self-determination is not to be viewed as synony-
mous with secession but as a choice between unity and secession. The
imposition of sharia law by the regimes in Sudan has been the major stum-
bling block to the IGAD peace process since the 1980s (Adar 1998a, Adar
forthcoming). The Abuja rounds did not yield any progress towards conflict
resolution. During the 1994 IGAD peace negotiations in Nairobi, Kenya, the
delegation from the Sudan Government reiterated the Government’s position
by stipulating that “sharia and custom as they stand are irreplaceable”,
stressing also that “legislation inspired by other sources are gauged and rati-
fied according to the principles of sharia and custom” (Petterson 1999:131).
These policy options by the SPLM/SPLA and the government in Khartoum
were harmonised into the IGAD Declaration of Principles (DOP).
The IGAD Declaration of Principles
The 1994 IGAD Declaration of Principles stipulated some of the central
elements of the negotiating viewpoints which have been suggested by a
number of interested parties to the conflict over the years. The Declaration of
Principles provide, among other things, that:
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the following principles are established in the political, legal, economic
and social framework of the country: Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic,
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peoples of Sudan must be affirmed. A secular and democratic state must
be established in Sudan.
(Horn of Africa Bulletin Sep-Oct 1994:27)
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to “reinforce and complement the IGAD process” (Horn of Africa Bulletin
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clear testimony to the importance attached to the Islamic movement towards
the centre. The Constitution provides that Sudan is a unitary state wherein
“people co-exist with their cultural diversity, Islam being the religion of the
majority, while Christianity and other religions and doctrines are given due
consideration inasmuch as there is no compulsion in religion” (Horn of Africa
Bulletin Mar-Apr 1998:25). The Constitution also provides that sharia
customary law (al-urf) and national consensus (ijma al-ummah) constitute the
basis for legislation in Sudan. It is unlikely that the NDA, if it were to come to
power, would overlook the growing internal Islamic movements, making the
option of maintaining a unitary state in Sudan not viable, particularly for the
SPLM/SPLA.
For most part of the 1990s the regime of al-Bashir rejected the IGAD
Declaration of Principles, maintaining instead that any form of a referendum
must take cognisance that the status of the Southerners is inseparable from
the rest of Sudan. The government of Sudan is fearful that the implementation
of the IGAD Declaration of Principles in toto may open up a pandora’s box for
the rest of the country, particularly the Nuba Mountains and the SBN. Though
in 1997 al-Bashir finally signed the peace process document incorporating
the IGAD Declaration of Principles, his regime still maintains that the docu-
ment is not legally binding on his government (Lesch 1999:3; Deng 1999:6).
Area linkages and tribal rivalries
The question of the Nuba Mountains and the SBN remains a difficult one for
both the Sudan Government and the SPLM/SPLA. At the 1997 IGAD negoti-
ations, the document presented by the SPLA/SPLM on the question of the
Nuba Mountains and the SBN contained the following “separate but parallel”
viewpoints: the right of self-determination alongside Southern Sudan, but
separately; that the Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the SBN are to
establish separate administrations during the transitional period; that the
Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the SBN are to exercise their right
to self-determination; and that the SBN and the Nuba Mountains are to
demand regional self-determination which incorporates their socio-cultural,
linguistic and religious ways of life (De Waal 1999:2).
The Nuba-SBN-South Sudan linkage was, however, moderated at the
1998 Addis Ababa IGAD negotiations by the Nuba-SPLA and SBN-SPLA
commanders Yusuf Kowa Meklci and Malik Agar, respectively. Taking cogni-
sance of the two regions’ incorporation into the larger South Sudanese
proposals, the two leaders suggested that the Sudan Government should
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Nov-Dec 1998:25-26). The IGAD peace process in Sudan has also received
support from churches concerned with the humanitarian situation in the
country and the Horn of Africa in general. At the end of their meeting in
Nairobi, Kenya, church leaders from the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa
regions representing among others, the All African Conference of Churches
(AACC), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), and the New
Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) as well as observers from the SPLM and
the Sudan Government declared their “recognition of IGAD as the primary
forum for peace in Sudan based on the Declaration of Principles” (Horn of
Africa Bulletin Mar-Apr 1998:27). The WCC affirmed its support for the
IGAD DOP as the viable framework and the basis for a just and lasting peace
in Sudan. At the end of the WCC Eighth Assembly meeting in Harare,
Zimbabwe, the delegates from Sudan stated in their press release that:
We call on the WCC to support the IGAD ... peace initiative with the
Declaration of Principles as the basis for resolving the Sudanese conflict.
The WCC should not be party to the international conspiracy of silence on
the genocide in Southern Sudan … The churches are in danger of showing
the same indifference to the plight of Southern Sudan as they did to the
plight of Jews under Hitler.
(WCC Press Release, no 34, 10 Dec 1998)
Although the northern opposition parties such as the Umma Party and the
DUP are sensitive to the idea of the secession of the South, they accept at
least in principle, the right of the Southerners to hold a referendum on their
future, which can lead to independence, provided that the separation can lead
to the establishment of two friendly neighbouring countries (Lesch 1999:2). It
seems that in retrospect Sadiq al-Mahdi (together with the Islamic-oriented
parties in the NDA) has accepted that during his tenure as President of Sudan
his Administration failed to accommodate the Southern question. Sadiq’s
domestic policies did not deviate radically from those of Numeiri who had
introduced the Islamic September laws prior to his overthrow by the military.
The NDA’s endorsement of the Declaration of Principles may also be inter-
preted to mean that it is a mere tactic used by the Islamic parties within it to
secure the SPLM/SPLA’s support to get rid of al-Bashir. Abandoning
Islamisation programmes on a long-term basis is bound to encounter difficul-
ties given the growing Islamic fundamentalism towards the centre in Sudan
led by, among others, Hassan al-Turabi (Mahmoud 1997; An-Naim 1988;
Warburg 1991).
The incorporation of Islamic laws into the 1998 Constitution of Sudan is a
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arms, particularly G-3s, Kalashnikovs, mortars, and light machine guns.
The Dinka-Nuer agreement already discussed is likely to reduce risks
involved in carrying out humanitarian operations to help millions of the war
victims, let alone victims of 500,000 to 2,000,000 land mines laid in Sudan,
mostly in the South (Horn of Africa Bulletin Sep-Oct 1994:34). The increasing
involvement of IGOs and NGOs on matters pertaining to humanitarian
concerns and conflict resolution is an added incentive to IGAD. The experi-
ences of the 1991-93 Dinka-Nuer conflicts concentrated around Ayod, Waat
and Kongor towns, dubbed the “Starvation Triangle”, which claimed over 
20,000 lives and reduced NGO operations, may never re-occur (Prendergast
1997, Rone & Prendergast 1994). In such war torn areas the internal NGOs,
for example, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC, Sudan Government’s
Humanitarian arm), the NSCC, and the Relief Association of Southern Sudan
(RASS, Machar’s SSIM humanitarian wing) as well as the international IGOs
and NGOs, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Operation Lifeline
Sudan (OLS), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), World
Vision Centre of Concern, CARE International, the Sudan’s Red Crescent
(SRC), Save the Children, Oxfam, and Doctors without Borders, among
others, have been instrumental in providing humanitarian assistance as well
as conflict resolution initiatives.
The US also provides substantial humanitarian assistance to the war
ravaged country, Sudan. In conjunction with other agencies, the USAID’s
Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern
Africa (REDSOESA) serves as a base for the Clinton Administration’s mecha-
nism for food security, sustainable economic growth and conflict prevention
strategies in the area (USAID 1999). The US humanitarian support for Sudan
has also been directed through the UN-led Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
and some of the NGOs operating in war affected areas. In 1995, for example,
the US gave over $30 million and $2.8 million in aid to the USAID and OLS,
respectively, for humanitarian efforts in Sudan. Between 1989 and 1998 the
US gave humanitarian assistance of over $750 million to Sudan, with over
$110 million disbursed in 1998 alone.
Armed forces and military spending
As Table Two indicates, Sudan ranks second to Ethiopia in its armed 
forces and military spending. The figures for the armed forces for the Sudan
exclude the PDF. In 1994 alone Sudan spent over $400 million in military
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conclude the self-determination process with the South if the inclusion of
Nuba and the SBN is the main obstacle. They, however, insisted that the right
of self-determination and secession by the South would not prevent them from
continuing with the liberation struggle in the North (Kuol 1999:2; Deng
1999:7). This decision was meant to close all avenues of intransigence on the
part of the Sudan Government on the question of self-determination for the
South.
The agreement reached in April, 1999 between the Sudan’s two largest
ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer, is likely to strengthen the liberation
movements’ negotiating leverage vis-à-vis the Sudan Government. The
meeting – funded by USAID – which led to the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant,
as the pact was dubbed, was brokered by the New Sudan Council of Churches
and signed by over 300 chiefs from both sides in the presence of the SPLA
commander Salva Kiir (a Dinka from Gogrial region) and the Bishop of the
Catholic Diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar Mazzorali (Horn of Africa
Bulletin Mar-Apr 1999:23). The Dinka-Nuer rapprochement is bound to have
positive and negative impacts on the SPLM/SPLA and the Sudan Government,
respectively. More importantly, however, at least for the SPLM/SPLA, is that
it is going to weaken the base of Riek Machar and USDF and SSDF as well as
Lam Akol’s SPLA-United, both of whom are already experiencing a rift from
within their ranks and a mistrust by the Sudan Government. The agreement
will reduce pressure on the SPLA forces and as such help their military
strategists to redirect their efforts towards the Sudanese Popular Defence
Forces (SPDF) and the People’s Defence Forces (PDF), estimated to be more
than 100,000 and 150,000, respectively.
For decades, the Sudan regimes have exploited the Dinka-Nuer ethnic
rivalries to weaken the Southern movements, particularly the SPLA. Apart
from this intra-ethnic conflicts the SPLA has also been engaged in military
conflict with the Sudan Government instigated militias called murahalin,
drawn mainly from the cattle raising Baggara Arabs (Rizeiqat, Rufaa al Huj,
and Misiriya) in Darfur and Kordofan areas, particularly in the late 1980s and
1990s (Bradbury 1998). Sudan also supports other militias against the SPLA
as well as giving material and logistical support to some militias against coun-
tries in the IGAD region and in other parts of the continent. Apart from giving
support to the murahalin and the SSIM, Sudan also provides logistical and
material help to the Lotohus, the Toposas, and the Mandaris operating in
Equatoria, Kenyan-Sudanese border, and Terakeka (north of Juba), respec-
tively. These militias were supplied with intelligence, landmines, and other
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procurement. Sudan’s military expenditure increased markedly, particularly
after the military takeover in 1989. Since then, the Government of Bashir
continues to spend more the $1 million per day in the war efforts against the
rebel movements in the South. Table Two shows that unlike some of the
members of IGAD, Sudan’s armed forces have also increased steadily since
the late 1980s. The figures for Sudan do not include the PDF established by
the Bashir regime to augment the SPDF. Whereas the SPLA exchange timber,
cattle, animal trophies for weapons, the Sudanese Government relies on oil
and mineral production for its military expenditure. The increased production
of oil is not only going to harden the negotiating position of the Sudanese
Government vis-à-vis the liberation movements but it will stagnate IGAD’s
peace process.
Oil and mineral production in Sudan have attracted a number of prospec-
tors such as Qatar’s Gulf Petroleum Corporation, Russian state-owned
YUKOS and Zarubezh-neftegasstroi, a Canadian firm, Talisman Energy,
Malaysia’s Petronas Carigali, Chinese National Petroleum Company, and
Sudan’s National Oil Company (Adar 1998a; Field 2000; Africa Confidential
1995:4). The Greater Nile Oil Project (GNOP), established and owned by
China National Petroleum Company (40%), Malaysian Petronas Carigali
(30%), Talisman Energy (25%), and Sudapet-Sudan National Oil Company
(5%), is responsible for most of the production of oil in the country (Field
2000). The NIF Government permitted Arakis Energy (later bought by
Talisman Energy in 1998) to hire Executive Outcomes of South Africa to
protect its oil fields near Bentiu. Crude oil is transported from Hijleij (West
Kordofan) and southern Darfur to Port Bashir, south of Port Sudan by
Chinese, Argentinean and British companies. The other operating oil fields
are at Adar, Western Upper Nile, and Unity, Unity State (Field 2000). Apart
from oil, the French, Chinese, and South African mineral companies have
also entered the Sudanese market for gold prospecting, with a Franco-
Sudanese firm, ARIAB, taking the lead in gold mining.
4. Summary of negotiating positions of Sudanese
goverments and rebel movements
The challenges which IGAD has encountered in its peace process in Sudan
are enormous and persistent. Figure One demonstrates the consistency and
change with respect to the negotiating positions of the Sudanese Governments
Table 2. Armed forces and Military expenditure of IGAD
members, 1985-1995
Source: US Department of State 1998
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are at Adar, Western Upper Nile, and Unity, Unity State (Field 2000). Apart
from oil, the French, Chinese, and South African mineral companies have
also entered the Sudanese market for gold prospecting, with a Franco-
Sudanese firm, ARIAB, taking the lead in gold mining.
4. Summary of negotiating positions of Sudanese
goverments and rebel movements
The challenges which IGAD has encountered in its peace process in Sudan
are enormous and persistent. Figure One demonstrates the consistency and
change with respect to the negotiating positions of the Sudanese Governments
Table 2. Armed forces and Military expenditure of IGAD
members, 1985-1995
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and the rebel movements over the years, particularly between 1956 and 1999.
As the Figure indicates, the central negotiating position by the Sudanese
authorities over the years has been that of retaining a theocratic Islamic
unitary state based on sharia laws. The rebel movements, on the other hand,
have championed the idea of the separation of church and state, autonomy
and self-determination.
Originally, Sudan regarded the civil war as an internal matter and was not
willing to negotiate its own sovereignty. However, over the years, particularly
in 1972 and 1990, Sudan officially expressed a willingness to discuss with
third parties matters pertaining to its internal affairs. As Figure One indi-
cates, for the first time, the NIF led Government accepted, in principle, the
idea of the separation of church and state inscribed in IGAD’s Declaration of
Principles. However, it is important that we make some observations with
respect to the various viewpoints which are still linked to the parties in the
conflict. For example, the SPLM/SPLA accepts the idea of a unitary state
provided there is a complete separation of church and state, equality for all
the Sudanese to be incorporated in the Constitution and equal sharing of
wealth. The Umma Party on the other hand supports a decentralised system
during the transition period, with special status to Southern Sudan and there-
after an envisaged vote for unity. In other words, autonomy of the South,
according to the Umma Party, would encourage the South to accept unity.
Conclusion
An emerging consensus
The situation in the Sudan is a complex one. It has attracted many state and
non-state actors with interlocking interests. Ever since its creation IGAD has
brought the parties to conflict in Sudan to a point where they have accepted,
at least in principle, the option of self-determination for the South. This is
obviously an achievement on the part of the Organisation, given the turbu-
lence in Sudan and the region in general. The transformation of IGAD into an
IGO responsible for conflict resolution, prevention and management has
given the organisation incentives on the Sudanese peace process. It is fair to
argue that a consensus is emerging among the belligerents with respect to the
option of self-determination for the South. Apart from the other pertinent
issues that I have discussed, the other areas of disagreement between the
Sudan Government and the SPLM/SPLA include the right boundaries of the
Figure 1. Conflict in Sudan and actors’ opinions on the
Southern Sudan questions, 1956-1999
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South. The SPLM/SPLA insist that self-determination is to apply to the
district of Abyei Dinka, Nuba Mountains, and South Blue Nile, areas consid-
ered to be culturally and historically part of the South. For IGAD to succeed
in maintaining the consensus which is emerging, a number of factors need to
be taken into account.
Recommendations and warnings
• First, a coalition of IGAD-OAU-UN peacekeeping force based on the
“US/NATO” model, with prior consent of the parties, is needed to main-
tain the emerging consensus. The peacekeeping force must be given a
broad mandate including peacemaking, and it should have the ability to
disarm and demobilise the parties to the conflict.
• Second, a referendum for the South and other marginalised areas should
remain an option for the affected areas. It will have to be supervised by an
international monitoring team.
• Third, there is a need for shuttle diplomacy, perhaps similar to the Henry
Kissinger-Lee Doc Tho diplomacy of the 1970s which ended the Vietnam
War, comprising experts appointed by IGAD, the OAU, League of Arab
States, Organization of Islamic States (OIS), and the UN to speed up the
peace process. This can be done by way of the appointment of special
envoys to IGAD to enhance the peace process and to deal with humani-
tarian issues in conjunction with IGAD. The OAU and the UN bodies
need to take a more active role in the IGAD peace process, particularly
given that Sudan has accepted, in principle, the DOP.
• Fourth, the UN’s pro-active involvement in the peace process would help
in the monitoring of the situation and the imposition of an arms embargo
against parties that do not adhere to the agreement.
• Fifth, IGAD should involve all the belligerents in the peace process irre-
spective of their political affiliation. The more inclusive the peace
process, the more likely that it would have a long lasting peace impact in
the area.
• Sixth, the IPF and other interested parties need to develop coherent and
co-ordinated policies based on long term objectives, for example, post-
settlement aid for reconstruction, debt relief, investments, and trade.
The initiatives by Egypt and Libya on the peace process in Sudan, while well
intentioned, may instead harden the SPLA position. Libya and Egypt are, at
the bilateral levels, banking on convincing the NDA to cease hostilities and
negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Sudan. There is a paradox in
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the way the world is merely watching while the Sudanese state continues to be
criminalised by those who purport to be speaking on behalf of their peoples.
The level at which the state is criminalised is taking a new dimension, with
the NIF led Government with its full knowledge and acquiescence re-intro-
ducing slavery.
Promising co-operation
The concerted efforts and direct initiatives of the civil society, particularly
the women’s bodies such as the Nuba Women’s group and the Southern
Women’s group working across the ethno-centric and religio-cultural divides
with their northern counterparts, as well as the NSCC, are steps in the right
direction that deserve incentives from all those concerned with democracy
and human rights. The 1998 Wunlit Covenant has laid the foundation for
frequent consultations among the Nuers and Dinkas both at the official and
the grassroots levels culminating into what has become known as the Nuer-
Dinka Loki Accord. The UN, OAU, and more so IGAD, can build on these
initiatives to enhance confidence among the belligerents.
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